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Abstract
We revisit the two-stage duopoly game with strategic delegation
and asymmetric technologies of Sen and Stamatopoulos (2015). We
show that their conclusions are misled by the restrictive assumption
that the extent of delegation to managers is restricted to a binary set.
Allowing for a continuous set of delegation incentives, we prove that
the delegation stage is a prisonersdilemma, the unique subgame per-
fect equilibrium entailing both rms hiring managers. At equilibrium,
the more e¢ cient rm makes higher prots.
JEL Codes: D43, L13
Keywords: managerial rms; Cournot competition; prisoners
dilemma
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1 Introduction
In a recent paper, Sen and Stamatopoulos (2015) examine a Cournot duopoly
with asymmetric cost functions and strategic delegation. As for the latter,
each rm can o¤er its manager a contract based on either pure prots or pure
revenues. They show that there are two pure-strategy equilibria where one
rm chooses the revenue contract while the other chooses the prot contract
(which is equivalent to not hiring a manager). In one of these equilibria, the
ine¢ cient obtains higher prots than the rival.
Here, we reformulate their game by removing their restrictive assumption
according to which delegation is chosen from a binary set, allowing owners to
choose the extent of delegation as a continuous variable, in accordance with
the acquired literature since Vickers (1985). By doing so, we show that (i) the
subgame perfect equilibrium is unique; (ii) it involves both rms delegating
control to managers over a mix of prots and revenues; (iii) it is the outcome
of a prisonersdilemma; and (iv) the more e¢ cient rm makes higher prots
than the rival.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The setup is laid
out in section 2. The subgame perfect equilibrium analysis is in section 3.
Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
Setup and notation are the same as in Sen and Stamatopoulos (2015), SS2015
henceforth. Two rms, A andB, operate in a market for a homogeneous good
whose market demand is p = max f0; k  Qg ; with k > 0. Each rm uses
a constant returns technology summarised by the cost function Ci =  iqi;
where parameter  i > 0 is average and marginal cost. The technological
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asymmetry is captured by the chain of inequalities
k > B > A > 0: (1)
The prot function of rm i is i = (p   i) qi: The game has a two-
stage structure. In the rst stage, owners choose the extent of delegation to
managers (if any). In the second, rms (either managerial or entrepreneurial)
simultaneously compete in output levels on the market place. If rm is
owners hire a manager, the latter is o¤ered a contract establishing that the
manager has to choose output so as to maximise
ii (qA; qB) = pqi   i iqi (2)
where i  0 is a strategic variable in the owners hands, to be chosen
at the rst stage of the game, before market competition takes place. The
managerial objective function (2) can be rewritten as ii (qA; qB) = pqi iCi;
i.e., as a weighted di¤erence between revenue and cost.
This approach to managerial rms has been pioneered by Vickers (1985),
in a pathbreaking paper. There, the managerial rm maximises Mi = i +
iqi; where i  0 is the weight given to output, to be set by stockholders at
the rst stage. Now observe that Vickerss maximand can be rewritten as
Mi = pqi   Ci + iqi = pqi   ( i   i) qi (3)
It is immediate to detect that ii (qA; qB) =Mi i¤
i =
 i   i
 i
(4)
If so, then the two models, i.e., Vickers (1985) and SS2015, are indeed isomor-
phic. Moreover, we also know from existing literature that Vickerss model
is isomorphic to Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987), where the
managerial maximand is Mi = ii + (1  i) pqi; i.e., a weighted average
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of prots and revenues (see Lambertini and Trombetta, 2002). All of these
structures being isomorphic to each other, they must necessarily generate the
same subgame perfect equilibria. In a nutshell, the conclusion emerging from
this well established literature since Vickers (1985) is that the extent of dele-
gation in a Cournot setting is strictly positive whenever a manager is higher,
and it is determined endogenously at the rst stage of the game on the basis
of demand and cost parameters. In SS2015, i 2 f0; 1g, i.e., the extent of
delegation is chosen from a binary set. In view of the above discussion, this
entails that i = 1 is indeed admissible because it captures the case in which
either the manager is absent or hes given a strict instruction to maximise
prots, while the opposite case of revenue maximisation with i = 0 is in fact
never subgame perfect. This is precisely what we are about to show in the
remainder. As a consequence, we shall show that the upstream stage is not
an anticoordination game - as claimed by SS2015 - but rather a prisoners
dilemma with a unique equilibrium in dominant strategies where both rms
hire managers.
3 The subgame perfect equilibrium
The subgame perfect equilibrium obtains by backward induction. Hence, we
rst have to look at the market stage, where three di¤erent situations may
arise, whereby we have to characterize three market subgames:
 (e; e): Both rms are strict prot-seeking units, with e standing for
entrepreneurial
 (m; e) or (e;m): One rm delegates and the other one does not, with
m standing for managerial
 (m;m): Both rms delegate
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In order to ensure the positivity of output levels in all outcomes, we
assume that
0 < A < B < b  k + 7A
8
< k; (5)
which di¤ers from the assumption appearing in SS2015 (p. 149, expression
(8)). This di¤erence is generated by the fact that here we treat i as a
continuous variable to be chosen endogenously.
The rst case entails A = B = 1, as in SS2015. In the resulting
asymmetric Cournot equilibrium, prots are:
i (e; e) =
(k   2 i +  j)2
9
(6)
which is the square of qi (e; e) : Given (1), the positivity of rm Bs output
is ensured by any
B 2

A;
k + A
2

(7)
with (k + A) =2 > b . This is the only case coinciding with the analysis in
SS2015.
Now we can tackle the asymmetric setup where rm i is managerial while
rm j is entrepreneurial (with j = 1), and i is chosen endogenously. The
prot of rm i is
i (m; e) =
[k + (i   3)  i +  j] (k   2i i +  j)
9
(8)
and, at the rst stage, the owner of rm i must solve:
@i (m; e)
@i
=   i [k + 2 (2i   3)  i +  j]
9
= 0 (9)
w.r.t. i, whose optimal value is:1
i (m; e) =
6 i    j   k
4 i
(10)
1Second order conditions for prot maximization are satised everywhere and therefore
omitted for brevity.
5
The resulting output levels are qi (m; e) = (k   2 i +  j) =2 and qj (e;m) =
(k + 2 i   3 j) =4, with all quantities being positive, irrespective of which
rm is hiring a manager, if B 2 (A; (k + 2A) =3). Moreover, the e¢ cient
rms output must not exceed the pure monopoly output when the same rm
is managerial, i.e., qA (m; e)  (k   A) =2; which holds when (5) is satised.
The resulting prots are
i (m; e) =
(k   2 i +  j)2
8
j (e;m) =
(k   3 i + 2 j)2
16
(11)
The last case is the one where both rms delegate. Here, the relevant
rst order condition (FOC) for the stockholders of rm i at the upstream
stage is:
@i (m;m)
@i
=   i [k   2 i (3  2i) + j j]
9
= 0 (12)
Solving the system (12), we obtain:
i (m;m) =  
k   8 i + 2 j
5 i
(13)
generating the following prots:
i (m;m) =
2 (k   3 i + 2 j)2
25
(14)
Before delving into the details of the rst stage of the game, it is worth
showing the equivalence between the present model and Vickers (1985).2 For
the sake of brevity, we shall conne to the case in which both rms delegate.
This, in Vickerss formulation, amounts to saying that managers are given
an incentive based on (3). At the market stage, the FOC is:
@Mi
@qi
= k   2qi   qj    i + i = 0 (15)
2Here we are reformulating the Vickers (1985) model under asymmetric technologies,
which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been done so far.
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so that equilibrium output levels are
qVi (m;m) =
k + 2i   j   2 i +  j
3
(16)
where superscript V mnemonics for Vickers. At the delegation stage, rm is
FOC is:
@i
@qi
=
k   4i   j   2 i +  j
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= 0 (17)
and the optimal extent of delegation is Vi (m;m) = (k   3 i + 2 j) =5.
If only rm i delegates control to a manager, expression (16) delivers the
asymmetric output levels
qVi (m; e) =
k + 2i   2 i +  j
3
; qVj (e;m) =
k   i   2 i +  j
3
(18)
and the optimal contract set by the owners of rm i is summarised by
Vi (m; e) = (k   2 i +  j) =4:
On these bases, one can prove:
Proposition 1 Under constant returns to scale, a delegation contract based
on revenues and costs is equivalent to one based on prots and output level.
Proof. This claim can be shown to hold true using (4). When both rms
delegate,
i (m;m) =
 i   Vi (m;m)
 i
(19)
Likewise, i (m; e) =

 i   Vi (m; e)

= i in the asymmetric case in which
only rm i delegates. As a consequence all remaining equilibrium magnitudes
coincide in SS2015 and Vickers (1985).
The above Proposition indeed proves that the two delegation models are
isomorphic, and therefore, by virtue of the analysis in Lambertini and Trom-
betta (2002), they are also isomorphic to Fershtman and Judd (1987) and
Sklivas (1987). Consequently, the subgame perfect equilibrium in our refor-
mulation of SS2015, with the extent of delegation is made endogenous, has
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to coincide with that we already know since Vickers (1985). This is what we
are going to illustrate.
The upstream stage in reduced form is depicted by Matrix 1.
B
e m
A e
(k   2A + B)2
9
;
(k   2B + A)2
9
(k   3A + 2B)2
16
;
(k   2B + A)2
8
m
(k   2A + B)2
8
;
(k   3B + 2A)2
16
2 (k   3A + 2B)2
25
;
2 (k   3B + 2A)2
25
Matrix 1
Proposition 2 The rst stage of the game has a unique Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies at (m;m), at the intersection of strictly dominant strategies.
Proof. The above statement results from the following inequalities:
i (m; e)  i (e; e) =
(k   2 i +  j)2
72
> 0 (20)
i (m;m)  i (e;m) =
7 (k   3 i + 2 j)2
400
> 0 (21)
This proves the claim.
In the unique equilibrium (m;m) ; the prot ranking is determined by the
sequence of marginal costs, i.e., A (m;m) > 

B (m;m) because A < B:
Hence,
Remark 3 At the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, the more e¢ cient
rms makes higher prots.
Something more can be told about the nature of the equilibrium generated
by the rst stage of the game. As we know from Vickers (1985) and the
ensuing literature, if rms share the same technology (i.e., A = B = ),
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the game represented in Matrix 1 is a prisonersdilemma, its equilibrium
being ine¢ cient for rms which would be better o¤ by remaining pure prot-
seeking agents.3
In the present setup, marginal costs being asymmetric, we have to eval-
uate the following expressions:
A (e; e)  A (m;m) =
7k2 + 2k (4A   11B)  62 2A + 116AB   47 2B
225
(22)
B (e; e)  B (m;m) =
7k2 + 2k (4B   11A)  62 2B + 116AB   47 2A
225
(23)
Note that both are concave in B. Solving A (e; e) = 

A (m;m) w.r.t. B;
we obtain:
AB =
58A   11k  15
p
2 (k   A)
47
(24)
while B (e; e) = 

B (m;m) in correspondence of
BB =
58A + 4k  15
p
2 (k   A)
62
(25)
and it can be quickly ascertained that AB  < 
B
B  < A < b < AB+ < BB+.
This yields our nal result:
Corollary 4 The upstream stage is a prisonersdilemma for all B 2 (A;b).
4 Concluding remarks
We have reformulated the strategic delegation model by Sen and Stam-
atopoulos (2015), considering delegation as a continuous variable. On this
basis, we have shown that the delegation stage replicates the structure of a
prisonersdilemma, yielding a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which
3In fact, the question addressed in Lambertini and Trombetta (2002) is whether rms
can avoid delegation in a supergame over an innite time horizon.
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both rms delegate control to managers, the latter being given a mixed-
motive contract. In such equilibrium, the more e¢ cient rm makes higher
prots than the less e¢ cient rival.
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